"It is but proper and fitting that this Court commend the unfaltering and very able assistance rendered to the accused, seen from the excellent presentation made of his case, particularly by his defense counsel, Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., of Davao City, who unstintedly and magnanimously contributed his legal talents and efforts in the hope that justice may ultimately prevail." X X X
Supreme Court Decision in 'People of the Philippines - versus- Lucio Lumayok' G.R. No. L-54016
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35273 July 25, 1983
Iglesia ni cristo, petitioner,
vs.
The honorable judge, branch i court of first instance of nueva ecija and
development bank of the philippines, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
reverse the decision of the respondent Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 4742 entitled Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the
National Treasurer of the Philippines. The decision of the respondent court
upheld the primacy of the respondent bank's title and ordered the cancellation
of the petitioner's title. The petitioner has come to this Court on the sole
issue of:
WHICH OF THE TWO TITLES IS SUPERIOR, AN EARLIER TITLE SECURED
ADMINISTRATIVELY OR A LATTER TITLE SECURED THRU JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?
The facts of the case are not disputed. They are summarized
by the respondent court as follows:
This is an action filed
by the plaintiff Development Bank of the Philippines against the defendant
Iglesia ni Kristo, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and the National Treasurer
of the Philippines.
As a first cause of
action, the complaint states among other things that plaintiff acquired a
certain parcel of land located at Sagana, Laur, Nueva Ecija, with an area of 19
hectares, more or less; that it acquired the same thru a sheriff's sale held on
April 2, 1952 on account of a foreclosure of mortgage securing an agricultural
loan of P4,500.00 granted to one Emilio Libunao; that on July 18, 1953 after
the expiration of one year from and after the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale, and after the mortgagor, Emilio Libunao failed to exercise
his right to redemption, the plaintiff caused the consolidation in its favor the
exclusive and absolute ownership thereof, and was issued T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in
its name; that said parcel of land was originally owned by Mr. Emilio Libunao,
who obtained a Homestead Patent on June 19, 1937, which was registered as
O.C.T. No. 5482 on January 19, 1938; that on August 2, 1966 plaintiff sold to
its former owner Emilio Libunao the said property for the sum of P10,953.23
under a Deed of Conditional Sale; that plaintiff learned that the defendant
Iglesia ni Kristo thru its followers and with its full knowledge and consent is
occupying the said parcel of land since October 3, 1966, and claiming the same
to be a portion of that certain parcel of land known as Lot B-2, Psd-47351,
covered by T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo was
originally registered on June 1, 1964 as O.C.T. No. 0918 under Decree No.
N-11506, Rec. No. 55081, Case No. 3244 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, issued on May 25, 1954; that despite repeated demands by plaintiff,
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo and all persons claiming it falled and refused and
still fail and refuse to vacate the said parcel of land to the damage and
prejudice of the plaintiff.
The second cause of
action is against the defendant National treasurer, the depositary and legal
custodian of the Assurance Fund under Act No. 496 against which plaintiff would
proceed for reimbursement of the purchase price of the property in question in
case of an adverse judgment.
Defendant National
Treasurer of the Philippines filed its answer on July 17, 1967 denying the
material allegations of the complaint, and alleging that the action is
premature, since the plaintiff may still recover damages from other persons.
Defendant Iglesia ni
Kristo filed its answer on July 25, 1967 denying the material allegations of
the complaint, and stating by way of affirmative defenses that it purchased in
good faith from Victoria Maravilla certain parcels of land situated at Barrio
Cebu, Laur, Nueva Ecija, which included the land in question; that these parcels
of land purchased were covered by certificates of title; that immediately after
the purchase, defendant Iglesia ni Kristo took possession of the property; that
granting that plaintiff's land is within the titled property of the defendant,
it has superior title over it. On July 25, 1967 defendant Iglesia ni Kristo
filed a motion to bring in a third party defendant in the person of Victoria
Maravilla, from whom it acquired the property in question. Then on July 2, 1968
it filed an amended third party complaint wherein the original third party
defendant was substituted by her heirs represented by Dra. Mercedes M. Oliver.
This was granted by the Court in its order dated July 9, 1968. On September 12,
1968, the third party defendant filed an opposition to the admission of the
amended third party complaint praying that the same be dismissed for being a
money claim. The Court in its order dated September 19, 1969 dismissed the
third party complaint. The parties have agreed to submit a stipulation of facts
upon which the decision of the Court win be based.
From the stipulations of facts submitted by the parties on
January 16, 1970, the following facts are admitted; to wit: that the property
in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the name of the plaintiff, and
T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said
property was acquired by the plaintiff in a foreclosure sale on April 2, 1952
from Emilio Libunao in whose name the same was previously registered on January
10, 1938 by virtue of a homestead patent of June 19, 1937; that defendant
acquired the said property from Victoria Maravilla who was the registered owner
of a parcel of land including the land in question under O.C.T. No. O-918 by
virtue of a decree/decision Rec. No. 55018, Reg. Case No. 3244 of the CFI of
Nueva Ecija on March 24, 1954; and registered in the Register of Deeds on June
1, 1954; that the land covered by O.C.T. No. O-918 was subdivided into four
lots with separate titles; that the lot in question falls within Lot B-2,
Psd-47351 which defendant acquired from Victoria Maravilla on November 5, 1964,
and now covered by T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in its name.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads:
... the Court hereby
declares the title of the defendant Iglesia ni Kristo, T.C.T. No. NT-53573 to
be null and void, and orders the Register of Deeds to cancel the aforementioned
title. The Court likewise orders the defendant Iglesia ni Kristo to deliver the
possession of the said property to the plaintiff or to its duly authorized
representative, and to pay the costs.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
respondent Court denied it. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision, the
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari raising the following
assignments of errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TITLE ACQUIRED
EARLIER BY HOMESTEAD IS SUPERIOR TO THAT SECURED IN A SUBSEQUENT LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
II
THAT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ASSUMING THE LAND
IN QUESTION WAS ALREADY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, PETITIONER OR HER PREDECESSOR
SHOULD HAVE FILED A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE ISSUANCE OF
THE HOMESTEAD PATENT.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NULLIFYING PETITIONER'S TITLE
AND CONSEQUENTLY IN ORDERING IT TO DELIVER TO RESPONDENT BANK THE POSSESSION OF
THE LAND IN DISPUTE.
The errors raised by the petitioner are grounded on one main
allegation, that the property in question was already of private ownership when
the homestead patent was issued in favor of Emilio Libunao, the respondent
bank's predecessor. The petitioner contends that the land covered by the
conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her predecessor
Mariano Padilla even several years before the Revolution of 1896 and that is
why it was adjudicated as private land and ordered registered in her name in
Land Registration Case No. 3244, LRC, Record No. 55081. With this as factual
background, the petitioner attacks the validity of the homestead patent and
title issued to the respondent bank's predecessor, Emilio Libunao.
The petitioner cites the case of Vital v. Anore (90
Phil. 855, 858) to support its contention that the homestead patent and the
consequent title are void. According to him, we should apply the rule in Vital
V. Anore that:
The rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the
Registration Act, becomes indefeasible as a Torrens Title is only true and
correct if the parcel of agricultural land patented or granted as homestead by the
government after the requirements of the law had been complied with was a part
of the public domain. If it is not but a private land the patent or homestead
patent are a nullity.
The rule in Vital is not applicable to this case. This
Court remanded the Vital case to the lower court for the taking of
evidence because of the following factual considerations:
A torrens title issued upon a free patent may not be
cancelled after the lapse of ten years from the date of its registration
because the statute of limitations bars such cancellation. But if the
registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the
free patent was transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land described
in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another who together with
his predecessors-in-interest has been in possession thereof, and if the
patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, then
the statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent
does not apply, and the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or
title to the land judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff
that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and
described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his
predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew
that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in- interest have been in possession
thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued
upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey
the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner
thereof. (Philippine Reports, Vol. 90, pp- 858-859)
In the instant case, the situation is reversed. Emilio
Libunao was given a homestead patent in 1937 and the Torrens Title in 1938.
Victoria Maravilla registered her supposed title to the property only in 1954
or seventeen years later. It is therefore, the title of Maravilla, the
petitioner's predecessor-in- interest, which should be declared a nullity. She
filed an application for land registration over property which had already been
awarded by the State to Emilio Libunao 17 years earlier and a title to which
had already been registered, 16 years before the registration of her title.
Insofar as the private, respondent and its predecessor are
concerned, the allegations of ownership since before the Revolution of 1896 are
purely self-serving and without probative value. There was no formal hearing on
this allegation in the court a quo because the parties stipulated the facts
upon which the decision would be rendered and this is not one of them. The
private respondent was not given an opportunity to refute or impugn the
veracity of the allegation.
Maravilla could not legally claim that she owned the lot as
her private property prior to its registration in her name in 1954 and even
prior to 1938 when title was registered in the name of Libunao pursuant to a
homestead patent.
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia ni Cristo (its
lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands, following
the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is
not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of
land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs.
Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132.
The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that category.
They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under section 48
(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890,
"all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that
the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation
of his title under section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho
dominical incoativo and that before the issuance of the certificate of title
the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it
still pertains to the State. (Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 and Republic
v. Gonong, 118 SCRA 729)
There is absolutely no showing in this case that the
exceptional circumstances mentioned in Cariño v. Insular Government and Oh
Cho v. Director of Lands are present. Even assuming that the land was not
yet registered in another's name when Maravilla filed the registration
proceedings, the land would have been public land in the strict legal sense
before 1954 as far as she was concerned.
The petitioner cannot assail the validity of the title of
respondent Bank's predecessor after 29 years from its registration. Our Land
Registration Law provides that upon the expiration of one year from and after
the date of the entry of the decree of registration, the said decree and the
certificate of title shall become incontrovertible and indefeasible (P.D. 1529,
Section 32). This provision is equally applicable to titles acquired through
homestead patents. In the case of Lahora v. Dayang-hirang (37 SCRA 346;
see also Lopez, et al. v. Padilla, et al.; 45 SCRA 44; Ramirez v. CA 30 SCRA
297) this Court held:
The rule in this
jurisdiction, regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by
the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor, is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter,
the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one
year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.
In the case of Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39
SCRA 676) we held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the
Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the
certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect
of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. We should add that the
Director of Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the presumption
of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead patent.
As a ground for setting up the second assignment of error,
the petitioner refutes the relevancy of the above rule to the case at bar asserting
that where the action is not for the revision of the decree of registration on
the ground of fraud but rather for the cancellation of the patent and
certificate of title on the ground that they are void because the Bureau of
Lands had no jurisdiction to issue the patent, the one-year period provided for
in section 38 of Act 496 does not apply. It cites Director of Lands v. Court
of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 71-76). It adds that a certificate of title
based on a patent is still subject to certain restrictions even after the
expiration of one year from its issuance pursuant to our resolution in Nieto
v. Quinez (6 SCRA 74).
Petitioner forgets that it was the defendant in this case. In
other words, what was sought to be cancelled was its Torrens Title and not that
of the respondent Bank. In raising such an argument, the petitioner relies on
the premise that the homestead patent and its corresponding title are void for
lack of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to issue the said patent for the
main reason that the land covered by the homestead patent was already of
private ownership when it was issued. In fine, petitioner belatedly attacks the
validity of the respondent Bank's title after it had become incontrovertible
for twenty eight (28) years already. To reiterate, the rule on the
incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title after one year from
entry of the decree of registration does not sanction this procedure.
Considering the circumstances of this case, we follow the
general rule that where two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier date must
prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration
where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding
under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
relies on the second certificate. (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
(102 SCRA 370); Pajomayo et at v. Manipon et al. (39 SCRA 676); Legarda
v. Saleeby (31 Phil. 590); De Villa v. Trinidad (22 SCRA 1167,1174);
Hodges v. Dy Buncio (6 SCRA 287); Register of Deeds v. PNB (13
SCRA 46); Alzate v. PNB (20 SCRA 422); Garcia v. Court of Appeals (95
SCRA 380); Gatioan v. Gaffud (27 SCRA 706).
The resolution of the first and second assignments of errors
disposes of the third alleged error. We apply the ruling in Pajomayo, et al
v. Manipon et al. (39 SCRA 676) that where the same parcel of land is
covered by two titles, necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be
superior over the other, the latter should be declared null and void and should
be cancelled. Petitioner claims that it is an innocent purchaser for value and
as such is entitled to the protections provided by law particularly the guarantee
of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of a Torrens Title after the
expiration of one year within which to file a petition for review. The
respondent Bank is the innocent purchaser for value in this case and is more
entitled to the protection claimed by the petitioner. The rule on successive
registration controls. The Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to
decree anew the registration of a land already decreed and titled. It had no
power to bestow validity upon the second decree. (Singian v. MRR Co. (60
Phil. 192, 203); Mabuhay Development Co. v. Ronquillo (38 SCRA 439); Lahora
v. Dayanghirang (37 SCRA 346)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.
Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.
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