"It is but proper and fitting that this Court commend the unfaltering and very able assistance rendered to the accused, seen from the excellent presentation made of his case, particularly by his defense counsel, Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., of Davao City, who unstintedly and magnanimously contributed his legal talents and efforts in the hope that justice may ultimately prevail." X X X
Supreme Court Decision in 'People of the Philippines - versus- Lucio Lumayok' G.R. No. L-54016
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140863. August 22, 2000]
Solar team entertainment, inc. And people of the philippines, petitioners, vs.
Hon. Rolando how, in his capacity as presiding judge of the regional trial
court branch 257 of parañaque and ma. Fe f. Barreiro, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The
question raised in this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus
is whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of
the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ)
has been resolved.
The
facts of this case are not disputed.
On
May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information[i][1] for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro (private
respondent) based on the complaint[ii][2] filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
(petitioner). The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 99-536 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F.
Barreiro” before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided
by public respondent Judge Rolando G. How.
Before
the scheduled arraignment of private respondent on August 5, 1999 could take
place, respondent court issued an Order[iii][3]dated June 29, 1999, resetting the arraignment of
private respondent on September 2, 1999 on the ground that private respondent
had “filed an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ)”.[iv][4] Private respondent manifested in the same Order that
she would submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal
on or before the second scheduled arraignment.[v][5] On September 24, 1999, respondent court issued an
Order[vi][6] denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the order that previously reset the arraignment of private respondent. Said order further rescheduled the
arraignment of private respondent to November 18, 1999.
On
November 10, 1999, private respondent filed another “Motion to Defer
Arraignment”.[vii][7] On November 15, 1999, before the scheduled date of
the arraignment of private respondent and before the date set for the hearing
of private respondent’s “Motion to Defer Arraignment”, respondent court issued
an Order[viii][8] further deferring the arraignment of private
respondent “until such time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is
resolved”.[ix][9] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order
was denied by respondent court on November 22, 1999.[x][10]
Petitioner
bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private respondent appeared
or submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court and up to now she
still has to be arraigned.[xi][11] Respondent court allegedly violated due process when
it issued the assailed order before petitioner received a copy of the “Motion
to Defer Arraignment” of private respondent and before the hearing for the same
motion could be conducted.[xii][12] Petitioner points out that despite the order of
respondent court dated September 26, 1999 which stated that the arraignment of
private respondent on November 18, 1999 is “intransferable”, respondent court,
in utter disregard of its own order, issued the now assailed order indefinitely
suspending the arraignment of private respondent.[xiii][13]
Petitioner
is convinced that the twin orders further delaying the arraignment of private
respondent and denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner violate
Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner
further submits that this instant petition raises “a pure question of law of
first impression”[xiv][14] since “it involves the application and
interpretation of a law of very recent vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493,
otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998”.[xv][15] Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law
that states that:
“Section 7. Time
Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. – The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared
before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever
date last occurs. xxx”
By
issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.[xvi][16] Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus
to nullify and set aside the order of respondent court dated November 15, 1999.
Petitioner
limits the issues to the following:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ARRAIGN THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF THE TIME LIMIT OF THIRTY (30) DAYS MANDATORILY
IMPOSED BY SECTION 7, OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT OF 1998”; AND
II.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DEFYING SECTION 12, RULE 116, OF
THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.[xvii][17]
The
instant petition is devoid of merit.
The
power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates
even after the information has already been filed in court is well
settled. In Marcelo vs. Court of
Appeals,[xviii][18] reiterated in Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,[xix][19] we clarified that nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul[xx][20] forecloses
the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed
in court.[xxi][21]
The
nature of the Justice Secretary’s power of control over prosecutors was
explained in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals [xxii][22] in this wise:
“Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,[xxiii][23] exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5,
8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the
Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of
the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and
control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the
Code:
‘(1) Supervision and Control. – Supervision and
control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of
duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x x.’
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of
R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
‘Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors,
the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform
such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the
interest of public service.’
x x x x
x x x x x
Section 37. The
provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief
of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also
conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act
directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or
action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.”
‘Supervision’ and ‘control’ of a department head over his
subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:
‘In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform such duties. Control,
on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.’
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice
secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by
an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts.
As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial
recourse be allowed.”[xxiv][24]
Procedurally
speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control
of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion.[xxv][25] The decision to suspend arraignment to await the
resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such
discretion. Consistent with our ruling
in Marcelo,[xxvi][26] we have since then held in a number of cases that a
court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and
for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the
information.[xxvii][27] This is in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo[xxviii][28] that
courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion over criminal
prosecution.[xxix][29] Thus, public respondent did not act with grave abuse
of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await
the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.
In
several cases, we have emphatically cautioned judges to refrain from arraigning
the accused precipitately to avoid a miscarriage of justice.[xxx][30] In Dimatulac vs. Villon,[xxxi][31] the judge in that case hastily arraigned the accused
despite the pending appeal of the accused with the DOJ and notwithstanding the
existence of circumstances indicating the probability of miscarriage of
justice. Said judge was reminded that he
should have heeded our statement in Marcelo[xxxii][32] “that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least respect
for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he (respondent judge
therein) should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending with
the DOJ.”[xxxiii][33]
It
bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate
or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.[xxxiv][34] Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to
determine prima facie case.[xxxv][35]
Petitioner
insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review
authority of the Secretary of Justice after an information has been already
filed in court may possibly transgress the right of a party to a speedy
disposition of his case, in light of the mandatory tenor of the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be arraigned within thirty (30)
days from the filing of an information against him. Petitioner then impresses upon this Court
that there is a need to reconcile the review authority of the Secretary of
Justice and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submits that “the Secretary of
Justice must review the appeal and rule thereon within a period of thirty (30)
days from the date the information was filed or from the date the accused
appeared in court (surrendered or arrested)”[xxxvi][36] if only to give meaning to the Speedy Trial Act.
We
are not persuaded. The authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an
information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable
conflict with the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial
Act.
Contrary
to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
prescribing the thirty-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not
absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the
same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence.
The pertinent portion thereof provides that:
“SEC. 10. Exclusions.
- The following periods of delay
shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
xxx
“(f) Any
period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge
motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the
request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such
continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant
in a speedy trial. No such period of
delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this
subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets
forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for
finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance
outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.”
Accordingly,
the view espoused by petitioner that the thirty-day period prescribed by
Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act must be strictly observed so as not to
violate its right to a speedy trial finds no support in the law itself. The exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of
“speedy trial” is “a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.”[xxxvii][37] In fact, in implementing the Speedy Trial Act of
1998, this Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98, Section 2 of which provides
that:
“Section 2. Time
Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. – The arraignment, and the pre-trial if
the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty
(30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The period of the pendency of a
motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying
suspension of arraignment shall be excluded.” (Emphasis ours)
As
stated earlier, prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in
abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition
for review questioning the resolution of the prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because
the determination of whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a
transgression of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be simply reduced to a
mathematical process. Hence, the length
of delay is not the lone criterion to be considered, several factors must be
taken into account in determining whether or not the constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated. The
factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof,
assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such
delay.[xxxviii][38]
The
importance of the review authority of the Secretary of Justice cannot be
overemphasized; as earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies that holds that “mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by
an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts.”[xxxix][39]
We
are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial
secures rights to the defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public
justice.[xl][40] However, in this case, petitioner as private
complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent, accused
therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal
case. The immediate arraignment of
private respondent would have then proscribed her right as accused to appeal
the resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section 4 of
DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice if the accused/appellant has already been arraigned.[xli][41] Hence, in this case, the order suspending the
arraignment of private respondent merely allowed private respondent to exhaust
the administrative remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case
before the court could proceed to a full-blown trial. Conversely, in case the resolution is for the
dismissal of the information, the offended party in the criminal case, herein
petitioner, can appeal the adverse resolution to the Secretary of Justice.[xlii][42] In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
aptly pointed out that:
“the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance
of an accused’s motion for review of the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution
of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating
prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon
proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken
therefrom to the Department of Justice.”[xliii][43] (Emphasis ours)
The
fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the
arraignment of private respondent before the “Motion to Defer Arraignment” of
private respondent could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was well within the power of public respondent to grant the
continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly
confers this authority.
Public
respondent substantially complied with the requirement of Section 10 (f) of the
Speedy Trial Act when it stated its reasons for the deferment and eventual
suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in its orders dated
September 24, 1999[xliv][44] and November 22, 1999[xlv][45]. In said orders, public respondent reasoned that the
suspension of the arraignment of private respondent was to give the opportunity
to the accused to exhaust the procedural remedies available,[xlvi][46] to allow the Secretary of Justice to review the
resolution of the City Prosecutor[xlvii][47]so as not to deprive the former of his power to
review the action of the latter by a precipitate trial of the case,[xlviii][48] and based on the discretionary power of the trial
judge to grant or deny the motion to suspend the arraignment of the accused
pending determination of her petition for review at the Department of Justice.[xlix][49] Despite the absence of a law or regulation
prescribing the period within which the Secretary of Justice must dispose of an
appeal, the presumption still holds true that in the regular performance of his
functions, the Secretary of Justice will decide the appeal in the soonest
possible time. Recently, the Department of Justice issued Memorandum Order No.
12 dated July 3, 2000 mandating that the period for the disposition of
appeals/petitions for review shall be 75 days.[l][50] In view of this memorandum, the indefinite
suspension of proceedings in the trial court because of a pending petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.
Section
16 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court does entitle the offended party to
intervene in the criminal case if he has not waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute it separately from the criminal action. However, the prosecution of the criminal case
through the private prosecutor is still under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor[li][51] and such intervention must be with the permission of
the public prosecutor.[lii][52] In this case, based on the power of control and
supervision of the Secretary of Justice over public prosecutors, the pendency
of the appeal of private respondent with the Secretary of Justice should have
impelled the public prosecutor to move for the suspension of the arraignment of
private respondent. Considering that
private respondent had already informed the court of her appeal with the
Secretary of Justice and had moved for the suspension of her arraignment, the
public prosecutor should have desisted from opposing the abeyance of further
proceedings.
Lastly,
petitioner’s argument that the suspension of the arraignment in this case was
in violation of Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
is likewise not tenable. Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that:
“Section 12.
Suspension of Arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at
the time thereof:
(a) The
accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the case against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such
case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) The
court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial question.”
There is nothing in
the above-quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the
suspension of arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated
therein. Moreover, jurisprudence has
clearly established that the suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited
to the two situations contemplated in said provision.[liii][53] In fine, no grave abuse of discretion attended the
issuance of the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private respondent
until her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[i][1] ANNEX “G”; Rollo,
p. 53.
[ii][2] ANNEX “C-1”; Rollo,
p. 24.
[iii][3] ANNEX “K”; Rollo,
p.71.
[iv][4] Ibid.
[v][5] Ibid.
[vi][6] ANNEX “P”; Rollo,
p. 84.
[vii][7] ANNEX “Q”; Rollo,
p. 86.
[viii][8] ANNEX “A”; Rollo,
p. 21.
[ix][9] Ibid.
[x][10] ANNEX “B”; Rollo,
p. 22.
[xi][11] Rollo,
p. 14.
[xii][12] Ibid.
[xiii][13] Ibid.
[xiv][14] Ibid.,
p. 3.
[xv][15] Ibid.
[xvi][16] Ibid.,
p.9.
[xvii][17] Ibid.,
p. 10.
[xviii][18] 235 SCRA 39
(1994).
[xix][19] 254 SCRA 307
(1996).
[xx][20] 151 SCRA 462
(1987).
[xxi][21] Dimatulac
vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998), pp. 709-710.
[xxii][22] 278 SCRA 656 (1997)
[xxiii][23] The 1987
Revised Administrative Code, Executive Order No. 292.
[xxiv][24] Ledesma vs.
Court of Appeals, supra note 22, pp. 676-678.
[xxv][25] Dimatulac
vs. Villon, supra note 21, p. 712.
[xxvi][26] Supra
note 18.
[xxvii][27] Venus vs. Desierto,
298 SCRA 196 (1998); and Dimatulac vs. Villon, supra note 21.
[xxviii][28] Supra note
20.
[xxix][29] Venus vs. Desierto,
supra note 27, p. 214.
[xxx][30] See Bonifacio
vs. Tolentino, 139 SCRA 307 (1985) and Dimatulac vs. Villon,
supra note 21.
[xxxi][31] Supra note
21.
[xxxii][32] Supra note
18.
[xxxiii][33] Dimatulac
vs. Villon, supra note 21, p. 712.
[xxxiv][34] Venus vs. Desierto,
supra note 27, p. 220.
[xxxv][35] Perez vs. Hagonoy
Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 126210, March 9, 2000.
[xxxvi][36] Rollo,
p. 12.
[xxxvii][37] JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, Vol.
1, (1987), p. 421.
[xxxviii][38] Dansal vs. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000.
[xxxix][39] Dimatulac
vs. Villon, supra note 21, pp. 707-708.
[xl][40] BERNAS, supra
note 37, p. 388.
[xli][41] Department of Justice Order No. 223 (June 30
1993), 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigation/Reinvestigations
xxx
“Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases: Exceptions. – No appeal may
be taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor finding probable cause
except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the
appellant had already been arraigned. If
the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appellant
said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.”
xxx
[xlii][42] Dimatulac
vs. Villon, supra note 21, p. 709.
[xliii][43] Supra note
18, p. 50.
[xliv][44] Supra note
6.
[xlv][45] Supra
note 10.
[xlvi][46] Supra note
6, p. 85.
[xlvii][47] Ibid.
[xlviii][48] Supra
note 10, p. 22.
[xlix][49] Ibid.
[l][50] Memorandum
Circular No. 12 also prescribes that the period for the disposition of Motions
for Reconsideration on Denial of Due Course and Motions for Reconsideration on
Extended Resolutions shall be ten (10) days and fifteen (15) days,
respectively.
[li][51] Cabral vs. Puno,
70 SCRA 606 (1976), p. 610.
[lii][52] FLORENZ D.
REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOL. II, 7TH
REV. ED., p. 236.
[liii][53] See Bonifacio
vs. Tolentino, supra note 30 and Dimatulac vs. Villon,
supra note 21.