"It is but proper and fitting that this Court commend the unfaltering and very able assistance rendered to the accused, seen from the excellent presentation made of his case, particularly by his defense counsel, Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., of Davao City, who unstintedly and magnanimously contributed his legal talents and efforts in the hope that justice may ultimately prevail." X X X
Supreme Court Decision in 'People of the Philippines - versus- Lucio Lumayok' G.R. No. L-54016
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141710.
Evelyn v. Rodriguez, and
andres abonita, jr., petitioners, vs. Sandiganbayan, and people of the
philippines, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The January 17, 2000 three separate
Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners’ motion to quash the second
amended information,[1]
denying the motion to defer arraignment,[2]
and entering a plea of “not guilty” for petitioners in light of their refusal
to plead to the information,[3]
are assailed in the present petition for certiorari.
The antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On September 24, 1996, acting upon an
information that rampant illegal logging activities have been going on in
different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated
freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol,
Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have
been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon
orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of Barangay
Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to
haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some were hauled inside
the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the
custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
On
On
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos,
Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for robbery[4]
and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829[5]
(Decree Penalizing Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) against petitioners
Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution
Office of Palawan.
By Resolution[6]
of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the
filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b),
P.D. No. 1829,[7]
and the forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez
being a public officer and the charge against her being work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review Action[8]
of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information[9]
for violation of Section 1(b) P.D. 1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners
before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 25065.
A warrant of arrest[10]
was accordingly issued against petitioners on
On
During the scheduled arraignment on
In the meantime, the special prosecutor
filed on
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting
upon a Motion to Admit Information[18]
which was filed by the special prosecutor, admitted the amended information by
Order[19]
of
Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a
Motion to Quash[20]
the amended information, to which motion the special prosecutor filed a
comment/opposition[21]
on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated filing thereof was due to the
transfer of the records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its new
office at the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
Thereafter or on
By Order[24]
of
On
During the scheduled arraignment of
petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in open court the
assailed separate orders denying petitioners’ motion to quash the second amended
information,[26]
denying the motion to defer arraignment,[27]
and entering a plea of “not guilty” for both accused[28]
herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of
the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for almost three years
is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as
accused to due process,[29]
they citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.[30]
They add that the repeated and ex-parte amendment of the information by the
Ombudsman resulted to inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial, which is
a ground for dismissal of the information under Section 13, in relation to
Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998).[31]
Petitioners likewise argue that the
simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations against them, one
before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the
Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959),
involving the same subject matter constitutes forum shopping which is expressly
prohibited under the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 directing the
summary dismissal of multiple complaints or charges, and necessarily places
both of them in “double danger of conviction and punishment for the same
offense.”[32]
Petitioners additionally question the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not tasked with
the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors
but are mere executive officials of their respective local government units
with entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation against
them is not in relation to their office.[33]
Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.[34]
The petition fails.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[35] cited by petitioners has a different
factual setting from the present case. The cases against Tatad remained
dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to dismiss them in light of
the following observations: political motivation played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; there was a blatant
departure from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation; and the long delay in resolving the preliminary
investigation could not be justified on the basis of the record.[36]
From the records of the case at bar, it
is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took only three months,
from
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan[37]
instructs:
The right to a speedy
disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the
determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that
maybe considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and
the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In
the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.[38]
Parenthetically, as reflected in the
following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed
to the delay, thus:
With respect to the
alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally
getting the case ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated
that, to a certain extent, the claim is valid although the delay is caused
not unreasonably but because of the exercise of the right of the accused
to determine whether or not they could be charged under the Information for
which they have filed Motions to Quash; thus, the delay cannot be
considered unreasonable nor the grounds for setting aside the amended
Information as it now stands.[39]
(Underscoring supplied)
The rule is well settled that the right
to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay.[40]
In further pressing for the dismissal of
the case, petitioners cite Sections 7[41]
and 13[42]
of R.A. 8493, averring that the unreasonable delay in bringing them to
arraignment is a ground for the dismissal of the case, they having been
arraigned only on January 17, 2000, after several and repeated amendments of
the information.
The records show, however, that it was on
account of petitioners’ continuous filing of motions that the arraignment was
deferred.
Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular
No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the pendency of petitioners’ motion
to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and pre-trial)
provided under Section 2 of said law.
Sec. 2. Time Limit for
Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused
pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a
bill of particulars, or other cause justifying suspension of arraignment shall
be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)
On the claim of petitioners that the
Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated amendments of the
information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be
amended in form or in substance without leave of court at any time before an
accused enters his plea.[43]
In another attempt at having the case
dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed forum shopping by
filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular No.
28-91 (Additional Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and
Complaints).
Assuming arguendo that indeed the same
information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was also filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the
Office of the Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its
Memorandum, “since the Information in Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with
the Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988, while the information before the
regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then, if there
is any case to be dismissed for forum shopping, that case should be the one
before the Regional trial Court, as it was the second action filed.”[44]
Petitioners further assail the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they were indicted.
Lamentably, petitioners may well have
been confused regarding the charge against them for instead of showing that the
offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
(obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that
they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 –
the offense subject of the investigation which petitioners allegedly obstructed
or interfered with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation
of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners’ argument that the act
complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as long as one
(or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying
position otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989,[45]
the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees in
relation to their office.[46]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with
the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez,
who holds a position of “Grade 27” under the Local Government Code of 1991[47],
committed the offense charged in relation to her office.
In Montilla v. Hilario[48],
this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be
direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can not
exist without the office.[49]
As an exception to Montilla, this
Court, in People v. Montejo,[50]
held that although public office is not an element of an offense charged,
as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected
with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions,
there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused would
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,[51]
the accused is held to have been indicted for “an offense committed in
relation” to his office.
Applying the exception laid down in Montejo,
this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,[52]
held that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it
may be committed by any person, whether a public officer or a private citizen,
the circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a member of the
Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course of trying
to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioner’s case squarely
within the meaning of an “offense committed in relation to the [accused’s]
public office.”[53]
In the present case, public office is not
an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under Section
1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that
the offense may not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office
of the mayor. As found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner
Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to exercise
general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces[54],
used her influence, authority and office to call and command members of the
municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which was still
subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
The joint-counter affidavits[55]
signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the letter of
petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:
To: SPO1 Juanito G. Gan and
PO2 Emmanuel Nangit;
PNP Members
of Taytay
Municipal
Police Office,
Taytay Palawan
Upon receipt of this
order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion Taytay,
Palawan, at the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order t]o haul
the flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of the Municipal Government
of Taytay and to turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.
For immediate strict
compliance. [56]
Reference to this above-quoted letter of
petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution[57]
of the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Palawan and the Joint Review Action[58]
of the Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.
What determines the jurisdiction of a
court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the information[59].
The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as municipal mayor,
took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the
municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D.
705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, the amended information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special
Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses EVELYN
VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of Section 1(b),
Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as follows:
“That on or about
October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both public
officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang of
the same municipality, respectively, committing the offense in relation to
their office and taking advantage of the same, confederating and conspiring
with each other enter the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center (RAC) at
Sitio Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while inside with force,
intimidation and against the will of the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT.
ERNAN O. LIBAO, did then and there willfully, feloniously, unlawfully,
knowingly and forcibly haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted
dimensions of ipil lumber, that were officially confiscated by a joint team of
EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNP-TINIGUIBAN COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES,
stockpiled inside the RAC for safekeeping while waiting for available
transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and brought the
same ipil lumber within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the
primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as
evidence in the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as
amended.[60]
(Italics supplied)
There being no flaw or infirmity then in
the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying
the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of not guilty for
petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered
without any grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and
[1] Rollo at 19-20.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] P.D. 1829, §1. -
The penalty of prision correcional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts: xxx (b) Altering, destroying,
suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with intent to
impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as
evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal
cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases.
[8] Rollo at 105-108.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
[31] Rollo at 11-12.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Supra note 30.
[36] Blanco
v. Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 108, 114 (2000).
[37] Ty-Dazo
v. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200 (2002).
[38] Order of
[39] Rollo at 19.
[40] Supra note 36..
[41] R.A. 8493, §7. Time
Limit between Filing of Information and Arraignment, and Between Arraignment
and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has
appeared before the justice, judge or court on which the charge is pending,
whenever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is
entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen days to prepare for
trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as
fixed by the court. xxx
[42] RA 8493, §13. Remedy
Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an accused is
not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as
extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the
accused. xxx
[43] 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, Rule 110, §14.
[44] Rollo at 192.
[45] R.A. 8249, “An Act
Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No, 1606 as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes” §4 (a) (1).
[46]
[47] R.A. 7160 “Local
Government Code of 1991” , §444 (b)(5)(d).
[48] Montilla v.
Hilario 90 Phil 49, (1951).
[49]
[50] People v.
Montejo 108 Phil 613 (1960).
[51]
[52] Cunanan v.
Arceo, 242 SCRA 88 (1995).
[53]
[54] R.A. 7160, §444
(b)(2)(v).
[55] Records of the
Sandiganbayan, Vol. I, at 26.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Rollo at 56-61.
[58]
[59] Madarang
v. Sandiganbayan, 355 SCRA 525, 532 (2001).
[60] Rollo at 130-131.