"It is but proper and fitting that this Court commend the unfaltering and very able assistance rendered to the accused, seen from the excellent presentation made of his case, particularly by his defense counsel, Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., of Davao City, who unstintedly and magnanimously contributed his legal talents and efforts in the hope that justice may ultimately prevail." X X X
Supreme Court Decision in 'People of the Philippines - versus- Lucio Lumayok' G.R. No. L-54016
Gilbert Y. Yap vs. Hon. J. Cedrick
Ruiz, et al.;
CA-G.R. SP No. 1040768; January 30,
2009;
Counsel for Petitioner: Atty.
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
COURT OF APPEALS
Orosa St., Ermita,
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
GILBERT
Y. YAP,
Petitioner,
-Versus- CA-GR
SP No. 104078
(Civil Case No. 01-1638)
HONORABLE J. CEDRICK O.
RUIZ, JDR Judge,
Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61
of
Makati City and, ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION
Promulgated;
January 30, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
ALINO-HORMACHULES,
J.:
Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing, on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the Order dated February 22, 2008 which dismissed petitioner’s
complaint without prejudice and the Resolution dated May 29, 2008 w2hich denied
his Motion for Reconsideration, of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Civil Case No. 01-1638 entitled “Gilbert Y. Yap vs. Allied
Banking Corporation” for Injunction with Damages and Prayer for retraining
Order.
The Facts:
Petitioner
respondent Allied Banking Corporation (Allied bank) is a domestic commercial
banking institution.
On
On November
26, 2001, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order, and on December 18,
2001, issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Allied Bank from consolidation in its name the title over
petitioner’s family home until the case is decided on the merits. On December 27, 2001, Allied Bank filed its
Answer with compulsory counterclaim.
On January
21, 2002, the RTC, in accordance with its earlier order dated December 18,
2001, issued the writ of preliminary injunction against Allied Bank and the
Register of Deeds of Makati City.
Subsequently,
the case was re-raffled to branch 61 of the RTC which was then presided by
Judge Marissa Guillen. The RTC then set
the case for pre-trial conference on
In the
scheduled mediation session on February 22, 2008, petitioner Yap and his
counsel Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera arrived at 2:15 p.m. and 2:20 p.m.,
respectively, while counsel for Allied Bank Atty. Francisco Llamas arrived at
2:28 p.m. Because of the parties’ failure to appear on time, respondent Judge
Ruiz issued an order of even date dismissing petitioner’s complaint and Allied
Bank’s counterclaim, viz:
When this case called for the second
time for the continuation of the Pre-Trial this afternoon, there was still no
appearance on the part of the parties herein and their respective counsel of
record despite due notice to them in open court last January 25, 2008 of this
afternoon’s continuation of the Pre-Trial.
Consequently, in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 18 of the revised Rules of Court, the instant case is hereby
DIMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The
counterclaim of the Defendant is hereby likewise DIMISSED.
Serve copies of this Order to the
parties and their respective counsel of record.
SO ORDERED.
Yap filed a
motion for reconsideration stating that his tardiness was due to confusion in
the revised elevator system of the Makati City Hall and the throng of people
using the same. The RTC, by resolution dated May 29, 2008, denied the motion.
Hence, this
petition on the following issues:
Whether or not the tardiness of
Petitioner Yap, Counsel for Petitioner Yap, and Private Respondent Bank in
attending the second session of the judicial mediation (JDR) is excusable;
Whether or not the Public Respondent
JDR Judge committed a reversible error in dismissing without prejudice
Petitioner Yap’s complaint on a technical ground.
Whether or not the Public Respondent
JDR Judge has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing without prejudice Petitioner Yap’s complainant.
The issue is essentially whether or
not Judge Ruiz committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petitioner’s complaint for tardiness of twenty (20) minutes during the second
mediation session.
Petitioner argues that the dismissal
of his complaint for one instance of non-appearance is too severe a sanction
and does not further the interest of substantial justice; and that in
dismissing the complaint, respondent Judge Ruiz acted as trial judge instead of
JDR Judge and violated his duty of bringing the opposing parties to a
settlement thus defeating the JDR objective of administering inexpensive and
expedient justice.
Allied Bank counters that attendance
in mediation and conciliation proceedings, including JDR, is mandatory akin to
attendance at the pre-trial, and the dismissal of the complaint for
non-appearance in the JDR conference is sanctioned by A.M. No.
04-01-12-SC-PHILJA.
The petition is impressed with
merit.
A pre-trial is mandatory and
plaintiff’s absence therein can result in the dismissal of the case. Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
states thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear:
- The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
proceeding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. xxx.
Indeed,
this power to dismiss rests on the sound discretion of the Court. However, this discretion must not be abused
and must be exercised by the peculiar circumstances of the case under the
consideration. There must be sufficient
reason to justify the dismissal. In the
instant case, the dismissal was done in erroneous hassle to the prejudice of
the parties. For one, there is nothing
in record to demonstrate that there was lack of interest of the parties to proceed. What is evident is that in the previous
proceedings, petitioner was in attendance and demonstrated vigor in pursuing
his case and its resolution. In fact, as
manifested, the parties are undertaking continuous negotiation in pursuit of a
settlement notwithstanding the dismissal.
If petitioner’s tardiness upset the RTC’s schedule, a simple admonition
instead of outright dismissal, would have been sufficient to inform him of the
judge’s intolerance of any display of tardiness or laxity. A single instance of non-appearance at the
pre-trial due to some unavoidable circumstance does not amount to willful
disregard of the rules and will not warrant the complaint’s dismissal. It
cannot be overemphasized that the policy of the Court is to afford every litigant
the amplest opportunity for the just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicality.
It bears
stressing that the rationale for institution of the JDR in our legal system is
to enable the parties to resolved their disputes amicably, thereby allowing the
parties to attain a closure of their conflicts in a manner that is less
time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational and more productive of
goodwill. Certainly, dismissing the
complaint on the sole ground of non-appearance where there is a reasonable
excuse therefore is not keeping with the policy of inexpensive and speedy
justice and the principle of primary of merits over technicality.
Inconsiderate
dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
resolution to the congestion of court dockets for, while they lend a deceptive
aura of efficiency to the records of the individual judges, they merely
postpone the ultimate reckoning of the parties.
Thus, where
the record is devoid of evidence reflecting the litigant’s flagrant disregard
for the court’s authority and the rules, there is authority that an order
dismissing a plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to appear at a
pre-trial conference must be reversed as too severe a sanction. Indeed, for a 20-minute tardiness due to what
is certainly a justifiable reason- the confusion occasioned by a change in the
court building’s elevator system-this case ins now being delayed by almost a
year and the earnest efforts of the parties to reach an amicable settlement of
their dispute is being stymied. The
public respondent’s action constitutes grave abuse of discretion warranting
correction by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated February 22, 2008
and the Resolution dated may 29, 2008 are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent Judge is ORDERED
to conduct further proceedings in this case with deliberate but reasonable
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
PORTIA
ALINO-HORMACHUELOS
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
NOEL
G. TIJAM SESINANDO E. VILLON
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
C E
R T I
F I C
A T I
O N
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
PORTIA
ALINO-HORMACHUELOS
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
Counsel for Petitioner: Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr.
Counsel for Private Respondent: Atty. Francisco Gerardo C.
Llamas